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INTRODUCTION
CONOMIC development was from the very beginning the focus of classical po-
litical economy and presently retains its original human welfare mission and
intellectual attraction through insightful anthropological, sociological, and
historical investigations.1 Within the context of complex and constantly evolving
sociospheres, the objective of a sustained better life for the masses is enhanced,
according to Nobel Prize winner Amartya K. Sen (1983, 1988), by functionings
and entitlements which cannot be implemented without a public commitment and a
deep government involvement.
Notwithstanding the inevitability of semantical differences, the real challenge of
development does not lie in eliminating definitional disputes pertaining to the ob-
jective of development but in illuminating those pertinent instrumental relations
which are relevant in each social milieu, and which, when properly activated, gen-
erate an internal development dynamic. Such a dynamic would exhibit characteris-
tics of uniformity in countries with high degrees of similarity in human and natural
resources, in institutions and in individual preferences. If advanced industrial coun-
tries converge toward similar patterns, the same cannot be observed in developing
countries whose differences are more pronounced than their similarities. The task
of establishing meaningful patterns of uniformity in the highly differentiated devel-
oping world is not easy, but if accomplished, it would guarantee substantial benefits
in the formulation of effective strategies and policies.
An area in which the search for such patterns goes on unabated is that of interna-
tional trade and openness. Forces of dependence, autarky, balance of payments,
international competition, vulnerability to external shocks affect the objective of
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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sible for the contents of the paper.
1 See Lewis (1984).
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developing countries to achieve some degree of balanced growth,2 and most cer-
tainly influence their patterns of trade. Although these forces are important, they
are beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on the investigation of possible
trade patterns and their impact on growth.
In the course of this investigation the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section the role of openness is examined along with citations of empirical studies
that analyze the impact of export growth and export growth volatility on the growth
of GNP. In the third section the rationale of Granger causality, which constitutes the
core of the paper, is presented, followed by short sections on unit root tests, cointegra-
tion tests, and volatility tests that are accompanied by a brief analysis of the respec-
tive statistical results. In the final section the conclusions of the paper are summarized.
I. OPENNESS AND DEVELOPMENT
The degree of openness varies among countries depending on such factors as eco-
nomic size, resource endowments, access to modern technology, and balance of
payments policies. The large demand for imports in developing countries does not
become satisfied fully due to limited export growth, and because foreign exchange
earnings from merchandise exports are used to finance both merchandise imports
and international services. Therefore the statistical relationship between merchan-
dise exports and imports may not be very close, and may be further influenced by
international loans, credit, and grants which often translate into imports of raw
materials and machinery that are needed for development purposes. These facts
may be significant in showing whether economic development is affected by open-
ness as measured by exports or imports.
For causality analysis it is necessary to investigate the cointegration properties of
exports and imports, but for less demanding approaches, under the implicit assump-
tion that imports depend on exports, the empirical studies concentrate on exports
and quantify the productivity benefits derived from their growth.3 Keesing (1967),
Bhagwati (1978), Krueger (1978), Chenery and Strout (1966), and Scitovsky (1954)
have pointed out with different degrees of emphasis that these benefits from exports
are derived (a) from the necessity of adopting the most advanced new concepts and
methods of production as a means of surviving in the harsh international competi-
tive environment, (b) from economies of scale that overcome the small size of do-
mestic markets, (c) from the removal of foreign exchange constraints through which
imports essential to development are financed, and (d) from positive externalities,
mainly pecuniary, that promote industrialization.
2 See Hirschman (1958) for the rationale of unbalanced growth, and Scitovsky (1959) for an analysis
of the trend toward balanced growth.
3 Kaldor (1967) suggested that causality runs from GDP growth to exports, rather than vice versa,
due to the positive impact of GDP productivity growth on per unit cost reduction of tradables
whose international competitiveness is thus improved.
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Studies of the impact of export growth on GDP growth cover a wide spectrum,
ranging from ordinary regression analyses to Granger causality tests. As more data
became available more countries were sampled and the tests extended over longer
periods of time. A chronological anthology of research in this area includes works
by Jung and Marshall (1985), Chow (1987), Kunst and Marin (1989), Sharma, Norris,
and Cheung (1991), Bahamni-Oskooee, Mohtadi, and Shebsigh (1991), Afxentiou
and Serletis (1992), Sharma and Dhakal (1992). Departing somewhat from the con-
ceptual framework of these works, Dollar (1992) observed that per capita GDP
growth was enhanced by outward-orientation represented by an index based on real
exchange distortion and variability; his conclusion is in essence neoclassical and
points toward the benefits derived from trade liberalization, devaluation of the real
exchange rate, and the maintenance of stable real exchange rates. Concentrating on
industrialization, instead of GDP, and letting prices reflect true scarcities, Clark
(1997) also found that developing countries were more successful when they adopted
free outward-oriented trade policies compared with price-distorting import-substi-
tution policies.
In contrast to the probable long-term relation derived from regressing export
trends on GDP trends, interest in the rather short-term impact of export instability
on GDP growth led to a different type of empirical studies. In principle export
instability, represented by instability of export earnings, that results from either
volume or price volatility, can have negative or positive repercussions on GDP
growth. On the negative side, it is hypothesized that export instability increases
uncertainty, exerts a detrimental impact on private investment decisions, and ad-
versely affects the efficiency of capital. Due to the close dependence of imports on
export earnings, instability in the latter causes instability in the former which amounts
to disruptions in both private development expenditure and in public investment
owing to the government tax revenue and export-import nexus.4 On the positive
side, the beneficial effects5 are based on Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis
or the precautionary motive for saving, whereby in the first case, deviations of ex-
port revenues from their trend lead to savings in the form of transitory income,
while in the second case, saving rates increase in response to increased uncertainty,
so that both cases lead to higher investment rates, which in turn promote GDP
growth.6 When both negative and positive repercussions are scrutinized under the
4 Export instability may also deprive developing countries of valuable imports by forcing them to
hold excessive foreign exchange reserves as they cope with risk management operations. See Lim
(1976).
5 See MacBean (1966).
6 Little credence should be given to the positive relation between export instability and increased
investment in developing countries. Instability in these countries is likely to induce hoarding or
capital flight rather than investment, and to cause price confusion that undermines the rates of
return to capital. See Dawe (1996).
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prevalent structural and institutional realities of underdevelopment, the beneficial
effects appear to be rather insignificant or unlikely due to the adverse effects of
export earnings shocks.
In principle, then, the expected negative impact of export instability on GDP
growth becomes an issue of determining how developing countries faced with nu-
merous rigidities deal with shocks, whether external or internal.7 Prima facie evi-
dence since the 1970s suggests that the more flexible NICs (newly industrializing
countries) were more successful than other developing countries in extricating them-
selves from the external oil shocks. Even though these are open economies, the
flexibility they acquired in their industrialization process rather than their export
orientation per se enabled them to overcome the external shocks.8 If developing
countries are shaken by shocks, the reason must be rather sought in the rigidity of
their economic structure that is riddled with bottlenecks, slow transmission of in-
formation, high risks, and traditionally low resource mobility than in their open-
ness and the volatility of their exports. The matter is not settled when export volatil-
ity is considered to exert an impact on GDP growth, until a definitive measure of
volatility itself is adopted. Which volatility index captures the totality of export
fluctuations remains a controversial issue. Variability in the indices used may be
another reason for the ambiguity of statistical results in addition to the ambiguity
that originates in the basic weakness of the assumption that export growth is a
reliable indicator of GDP growth.9
By and large there is stronger evidence for a negative than a positive relationship
between export instability and GDP growth. Some of the contradictory results can
be attributed to sample differences, while others arise from differences in econo-
metric modeling. For example, the difference between the results of Gyimah-
Brempong (1991), who found that export variability exerted a significant and nega-
tive impact on the growth of twenty-three sub-Saharan African countries, and those
of Fosu (1992) who found that the same negative relation was statistically not sig-
nificant for thirty-five African countries and much weaker for a subsample of thirty
sub-Saharan countries is due to modeling differences. An example of contradictory
results due to sample coverage is provided by Moran (1983) who found that the
growth of countries sampled from 1954 to 1975 was not affected by export instabil-
7 Internal shocks, in the case of export instability, result from lower export volumes largely due to
poor domestic harvests, whereas external shocks result, to a greater extent, from declines in export
international prices, and to a lesser extent from decreases in the demand volume of exports.
8 Flexibility as a qualitative characterization defies accurate measurement, and in its place such proxy
variables as export ratios are employed in empirical work. As indicated earlier, however, export
ratios are not necessarily representative of development which in large and resource-rich countries
may depend mostly on domestic rather than on external forces.
9 For an early development of a volatility index see Glezakos (1973); for a list of the most commonly
used indices in empirical studies see Moran (1983).
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ity. Although for the subperiod 1954–65 he observed a statistically significant nega-
tive relation, he found no relation for the subperiod 1966–75. Dawe (1996) re-
ported that (a) export instability exerted a negative impact on the growth of eighty-
five countries, and (b) export instability and investment were positively related; the
latter relation did not affect his overall results probably because of the low correla-
tion between investment and growth or because investment is primarily determined
by factors other than export revenue volatility. Love (1992) also found a negative
relation between export instability and income instability in a causality analysis of
twenty developing countries.
Researchers investigated another aspect of instability manifested by changes in
the terms of trade and their influence on GDP. Using squared deviations from a time
trend as a proxy for terms of trade, Basu and McLeod (1991) showed that terms of
trade shocks and variability reduced economic growth in eleven Latin American
countries and the Philippines and explained up to 50 per cent of the long-term
variation in GDP levels in ten of the twelve sampled countries. Similarly, using
standard deviations of first differences as a proxy for terms of trade instability, Van
Wincoop (1992) found that in a multi-varied cross-country regression analysis of
eighty-one countries from 1968 to 1988, the increased uncertainty in the terms of
trade caused significant withdrawals of labor from risky tradable sectors and thus
affected negatively output growth.
An inference derived from theoretical reasoning and empirical findings is that
shocks—whether external or internal—are more likely than not to exert a negative
than positive impact on GDP growth. Understanding the mechanisms of causality
in any relation is a prerequisite to minimizing the risks inherent to these shocks
which are liable to hinder the development process. Countries are at different de-
velopment stages and have different structural and institutional characteristics re-
sulting in different degrees of flexibility that enable them to cope in their own indi-
vidual manner with the different kinds of shocks to which they are exposed. In such
a variable environment, common patterns of economic behavior may to be highly
predictable, but cannot be excluded in advance. If the relation between export growth
and GDP growth were to be statistically verified, economic problems could be more
readily addressed by policy makers. This study was undertaken to examine these
aspects.
II. STATISTICAL APPROACH OF STUDY
A time-series analysis was employed in this study covering a sample of fifty devel-
oping countries over the period 1970 to 1993, namely, fifteen countries from sub-
Saharan Africa, three from South Asia, six from East Asia and the Pacific, nineteen
from Latin America and Caribbean, and seven from the Middle East and North
Africa. All the countries with continuous annual data pertaining to GNP, merchan-
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dise exports and imports were included in the sample. Data were extracted from
various World Bank World Tables, especially from World Tables 1994, which in-
corporate and update several revisions of earlier years. All the data expressed in
U.S. dollars represent as far as possible constant rather than nominal values, and
owing to the development nature of the paper they were converted to per capita
terms when needed.
Our objective was to examine possible causality relations between the growth of
GNP and exports, as well as between that of GNP and imports. In the latter case,
imports were considered to take into account private foreign inflows of direct or
portfolio investment and commercial bank lending as well as foreign official assis-
tance from governments or international institutions, which together enhance
development efforts in addition to the contribution made by foreign exchange earn-
ings from exports.10 The statistical properties of data pertaining to the three vari-
ables must be checked for stationarity through unit root tests, and for cointegration
in order to examine long-term equilibrium relations and ensure that the causality
tests do not produce spurious results. When the series are cointegrated, the causal-
ity tests must be carried out in first differences with an error correction term in-
cluded, in contrast to non-cointegrated series which require that causality tests be
conducted in first differences without the error correction term. In addition to cau-
sality tests, volatility models that display the impact of fluctuations in the variables
were used to shed some light on the importance of variability of the time series.
A description and a justification of these statistical procedures are briefly pro-
vided.
III. UNIT ROOT TESTS
Whether economic time series have a unit root or not has important implications in
empirical work, for estimation and hypothesis testing, both of which rely on as-
ymptotic distribution theory. It has been recognized, for example, that inappropri-
ate detrending of integrated processes produces spurious variation in the detrending
series (at low frequencies), while inappropriate differencing of trending processes
produces spurious variation in the differenced series (at high frequencies). Hence,
in order to determine the appropriate form in which the Granger causality tests will
be carried out, the time series properties of the data must first be investigated.
10
 The unwillingness of commercial banks and multinationals to invest or lend funds to developing
countries after the early 1980s debt crisis was gradually overcome by the improvement of world
economic conditions. Foreign indebtedness problems, especially of low-income countries, still
remain, and are periodically aggravated by crises. The impact of these crises has been until now
restricted to one region or another with less severe repercussions on the rest of the world. The
original pessimism from the recent Asian crisis appears to have been exaggerated, and there is no
reason to believe that another crisis is likely to engulf the entire world.
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The literature on unit root testing is vast.11 Here we tested for unit roots using
three alternative procedures to deal with anomalies that arise when the data do not
provide information about the existence of a unit root. In particular in Table I, we
report p-values for the augmented “weighted symmetric” (WS) unit root test,12 the
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test,13 and the nonparametric, Z(tαˆ), test of Phillips
(1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988). These p-values (calculated using TSP 4.3)
are based on the response surface estimates given by MacKinnon (1994). For the
WS and ADF tests, the optimal lag length was adopted in the order selected by the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) plus 2.14 The Z(tαˆ) test was performed with the
same Dickey-Fuller regression variables, without the use of augmenting lags. Based
on the p-values for the WS, ADF, and Z(tαˆ) test statistics reported in Table I, the
null hypothesis of a unit root in logged per capita levels cannot in general be re-
jected. This is consistent with the Nelson and Plosser (1982) argument that most of
the macroeconomic time series have a stochastic trend. Since the series are inte-
grated of order one or I(1) in the terminology of Engle and Granger (1987), and
their first differences are stationary, we proceeded to the next step and tested for
cointegration in order to determine the form in which causality tests will be carried
out.
IV. COINTEGRATION TESTS
Cointegration aims at dealing explicitly with the analysis of the relationship be-
tween nonstationary time series. In particular, it allows individual time series to be
integrated of order one or I(1) in the terminology of Engle and Granger (1987), but
requires that a linear combination of these series be I(0). Therefore, the basic con-
cept of cointegration is to search for linear combinations of individually nonstationary
time series that are themselves stationary.
Several methods have been proposed in the literature for testing for cointegration.15
In Table II, we list the p-values of the most frequently used Engle and Granger
(1987) cointegration test, for two systems—(GNP, exports) and (GNP, imports).
The test involves regressing one variable on the other to obtain the ordinary least
squares (OLS) residuals ê. A test of the null hypothesis of no cointegration is based
on testing for a unit root in the regression residuals ê using the ADF test and simu-
lated critical values which correctly take into account the number of variables in the
cointegrating regression.
11 See Campbell and Perron (1991) and Stock (1994) for selective surveys, and Enders (1995, Chap.
4) for a textbook treatment.
12 See Pantula et al. (1994).
13 See Dickey and Fuller (1981).
14 See Pantula et al. (1994) for details regarding the advantages of this rule for choosing the number
of augmenting lags.
15 See, for example Gonzalo (1994).
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TABLE  I
UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS IN LOGGED PER CAPITA LEVELS
Country
GNP Exports Imports
WS ADF Z(tαˆ) WS ADF Z(tαˆ) WS ADF Z(tαˆ)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon .999 .598 .999 .996 .192 .997 .932 .904 .997
Congo .650 .984 .439 .564 .999 .437 .983 .596 .946
Côte d’Ivoire .980 .032 .987 .890 .029 .981 .826 .000 .978
Ghana .579 .000 .926 .311 .879 .943 .723 .971 .864
Kenya .999 .326 .992 .862 .000 .934 .901 .000 .973
Madagascar .920 .003 .969 .902 .000 .968 .758 .003 .924
Malawi .982 .075 .853 .998 .703 .534 .569 .767 .277
Mali .850 .157 .972 .914 .926 .832 .962 .966 .866
Mauritius .984 .169 .912 .389 .798 .899 .515 .810 .914
Nigeria .857 .665 .971 .962 .155 .902 .305 .916 .946
Senegal .771 .001 .956 .866 .041 .648 .944 .923 .925
South Africa .948 .319 .950 .977 .000 .962 .900 .744 .935
Tanzania .382 .665 .997 .926 .031 .847 .938 .379 .880
Zambia .623 .007 .942 .071 .955 .711 .059 .539 .801
Zimbabwe .993 .000 .987 .952 .000 .936 .861 .000 .930
South Asia
India .991 .982 .999 .956 .019 .870 .960 .118 .991
Pakistan .986 .921 .797 .267 .953 .225 .960 .271 .797
Sri Lanka .749 .912 .883 .655 .658 .704 .700 .034 .875
East Asia and Pacific
China .688 .397 .863 .723 .568 .891 .827 .040 .877
Indonesia .996 .608 .975 .962 .201 .923 .991 .000 .943
Korea, Rep. .910 .000 .979 .997 .000 .926 .977 .044 .983
Malaysia .997 .034 .965 .825 .445 .924 .848 .469 .951
Philippines .981 .042 .971 .339 .000 .770 .802 .523 .928
Thailand .981 .015 .941 .762 .972 .884 .432 .309 .879
Latin America and Caribbean
Argentina .689 .023 .797 .893 .840 .934 .625 .008 .881
Barbados .999 .388 .999 .779 .742 .396 .969 .999 .997
Bolivia .985 .225 .938 .869 .659 .970 .669 .307 .912
Brazil .994 .281 .946 .997 .233 .964 .928 .476 .856
Chile .213 .000 .968 .312 .000 .666 .307 .566 .944
Colombia .995 .193 .989 .861 .816 .973 .626 .670 .927
Costa Rica .898 .000 .937 .675 .000 .941 .774 .673 .897
Ecuador .974 .696 .978 .975 .018 .930 .944 .738 .952
El Salvador .994 .431 .864 .689 .107 .946 .661 .110 .851
Guatemala .939 .006 .976 .939 .000 .966 .855 .026 .911
Honduras .993 .999 .999 .948 .134 .992 .869 .000 .974
Jamaica .536 .690 .862 .653 .583 .929 .158 .940 .868
Mexico .941 .493 .917 .984 .897 .973 .575 .000 .912
Nicaragua .907 .999 .986 .939 .115 .926 .989 .081 .852
Paraguay .962 .008 .969 .946 .576 .983 .848 .189 .968
Peru .851 .669 .838 .523 .003 .217 .225 .195 .151
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Trinidad & Tobago .969 .988 .989 .936 .896 .955 .870 .535 .898
Uruguay .936 .701 .941 .887 .796 .973 .766 .516 .946
Venezuela .922 .003 .984 .847 .348 .948 .933 .829 .945
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria .998 .000 .999 .904 .491 .982 .917 .133 .959
Egypt .995 .999 .999 .929 .479 .939 .983 .072 .977
Morocco .972 .000 .960 .799 .000 .930 .950 .696 .955
Oman .993 .377 .994 .907 .686 .962 .976 .531 .894
Saudi Arabia .987 .946 .948 .771 .000 .914 .984 .000 .970
Tunisia .994 .000 .935 .964 .089 .935 .987 .559 .935
Turkey .986 .422 .926 .829 .995 .769 .895 .994 .056
Note: Numbers in the WS, ADF, and Z(tαˆ) columns are tail areas of unit root tests. Low p-
values reject the null hypothesis of a unit root.
TABLE  I  (Continued)
Country
GNP Exports Imports
WS ADF Z(tαˆ) WS ADF Z(tαˆ) WS ADF Z(tαˆ)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE  II
ENGLE-GRANGER COINTEGRATION TEST RESULTS
System
Country (GNP, Exports) (GNP, Imports)Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
GNP Exports GNP Imports
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon .467 .651 .828 .781
Congo .960 .320 .937 .958
Côte d’Ivoire .292 .307 .804 .866
Ghana .212 .786 .966 .713
Kenya .382 .936 .775 .675
Madagascar .504 .664 .871 .646
Malawi .777 .699 .920 .716
Mali .911 .908 .614 .846
Mauritius .713 .628 .778 .782
Nigeria .977 .840 .916 .376
Senegal .427 .362 .537 .824
South Africa .763 .983 .934 .883
Tanzania .911 .859 .601 .462
Zambia .798 .849 .764 .269
Zimbabwe .716 .691 .894 .883
South Asia
India .908 .478 .090 .720
Pakistan .009 .932 .851 .146
Sri Lanka .066 .829 .936 .784
East Asia and Pacific
China .874 .339 .548 .615
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Indonesia .678 .365 .742 .854
Korea, Rep. .426 .811 .393 .389
Malaysia .936 .825 .863 .420
Philippines .596 .152 .984 .967
Thailand .782 .530 .886 .899
Latin America and Caribbean
Argentina .915 .818 .900 .459
Barbados .343 .102 .691 .639
Bolivia .631 .968 .893 .267
Brazil .774 .852 .114 .032
Chile .466 .991 .834 .392
Colombia .787 .456 .990 .000
Costa Rica .669 .488 .208 .713
Ecuador .799 .477 .961 .879
El Salvador .547 .669 .075 .841
Guatemala .822 .707 .047 .002
Honduras .380 .730 .907 .950
Jamaica .981 .991 .092 .469
Mexico .843 .812 .774 .641
Nicaragua .565 .627 .509 .625
Paraguay .630 .906 .591 .234
Peru .804 .613 .494 .185
Trinidad & Tobago .879 .204 .093 .053
Uruguay .631 .943 .041 .115
Venezuela .803 .190 .942 .861
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria .640 .450 .847 .559
Egypt .951 .488 .932 .625
Morocco .988 .415 .407 .658
Oman .529 .093 .784 .018
Saudi Arabia .947 .870 .413 .571
Tunisia .532 .002 .372 .332
Turkey .507 .817 .947 .653
Note: All the tests use a constant and trend variable. Asymmetric p-values are computed us-
ing the coefficients in MacKinnon (1994). The numbers of augmenting logs are determined
using the AIC + 2 rule. Low p-values reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration.
TABLE  II  (Continued)
System
Country (GNP, Exports) (GNP, Imports)Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
GNP Exports GNP Imports
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration test was performed using the
logarithms of the per capita series and in each system the test was first conducted
with GNP as the dependent variable in the cointegrating regression and then re-
peated with the other variable as the dependent variable. We used a constant and a
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trend variable and selected the number of augmenting lags based on the AIC + 2
rule.16 Asymptotic p-values were computed using the coefficients in MacKinnon
(1994). The results suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegration between
GNP and each of “exports” and “imports” cannot in general be rejected (at the 5 per
cent level).
In Table III, we present the results in the same way as those in Table II, for
cointegration between “exports” and “imports.” Clearly, the null hypothesis of no
cointegration cannot be rejected here as well. Because of the cointegration proper-
ties of the series in what follows, the causality tests were conducted in growth rates.
V. VOLATILITY MODELING
The conventional approach to modeling volatility in macroeconomic variables uses
moving standard deviations of growth rates as measures of variability. Such mea-
sures, however, are inappropriate since they are ad hoc, non-parametric estimates.
In this paper, we used autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH)–type
models to capture the time-varying conditional variance as a parameter generated
from a time-series model of the conditional mean and variance of the growth rate.
Let µt be the growth rate of a series with conditional forecast E(µt|Ωt–1) as indi-
cated in the following equation
µ t = E(µt |Ω t−1) + εt, (1)
where Ωt−1 is the conditioning information set on which forecasts are based and the
forecast error εt has zero mean and conditional variance given by
2 2E(ε t |Ω t−1) = σ t. (2)
Our objective is to use conditional volatility models to capture the time-dependent
heteroscedastic distribution of εt. By capturing this feature of the data, we can pro-
2duce a forecasted variance σˆ t, along with a growth forecast error εˆ t, such that the
standardized residuals εˆ t /σˆ t are homoscedastic and independent.
Among the several conditional volatility models that have been proposed for
capturing time-dependent heteroscedastic distributions, the most popular are mem-
bers of Engle’s (1982) autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) family.
One such model, widely used in the literature, is Bollerslev’s (1986) generalized
ARCH(1, 1), or GARCH(1, 1) symmetric volatility model,
2 2 2σ t = w0 + α 1ε t−1 + β1σ t−1, (3)
with w0 > 0, α1 ≥ 0, and β1 ≥ 0. This model allows the conditional variance of ε t to
be an autoregressive moving average, ARMA (1, 1) process, and harbors as special
16 See Pantula et al. (1994) for more details.
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TABLE  III
ENGLE-GRANGER COINTEGRATION TEST RESULTS BETWEEN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
Country
Dependent Variable
Exports Imports
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon .388 .023
Congo .780 .894
Côte d’Ivoire .422 .515
Ghana .693 .901
Kenya .991 .465
Madagascar .377 .585
Malawi .916 .391
Mali .982 .165
Mauritius .384 .611
Nigeria .121 .614
Senegal .717 .269
South Africa .309 .687
Tanzania .398 .063
Zambia .423 .444
Zimbabwe .238 .212
South Asia
India .097 .957
Pakistan .333 .629
Sri Lanka .683 .608
East Asia and Pacific
China .107 .293
Indonesia .124 .173
Korea, Rep. .558 .434
Malaysia .416 .119
Philippines .022 .424
Thailand .538 .305
Latin America and Caribbean
Argentina .609 .602
Barbados .587 .723
Bolivia .789 .737
Brazil .830 .106
Chile .702 .353
Colombia .502 .511
Costa Rica .924 .904
Ecuador .143 .409
El Salvador .982 .961
Guatemala .878 .750
Honduras .989 .596
Jamaica .597 .476
Mexico .976 .723
Nicaragua .730 .558
Paraguay .947 .864
Peru .963 .681
Trinidad & Tobago .239 .658
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Uruguay .931 .735
Venezuela .382 .987
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria .216 .419
Egypt .730 .381
Morocco .017 .364
Oman .461 .149
Saudi Arabia .402 .772
Tunisia .828 .886
Turkey .870 .721
Note: All the tests use a constant and trend variable. Asymmetric p-values are computed us-
ing the coefficients in MacKinnon (1994). The numbers of augmenting logs are determined
using the AIC + 2 rule. Low p-values reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration.
TABLE  III  (Continued)
Country
Dependent Variable
Exports Imports
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
cases a variety of other models, including the Engle (1982) ARCH (β1 = 0) and
Bollerslev (1986) integrated GARCH (α1 + β1 = 1) models.
2Within the context of this model, the estimated σ t is the conditional variance of
the growth rate of the series—that is, the variability of the growth rate expected to
prevail (next period) given currently available information. The unexpected com-
ponent of growth is given by εˆ t = µ t − µˆ t, where µˆt = E(µ t |Ω t−1) is the conditional
expectation of µt . In this expression εˆ t does not reflect changes in conditional vari-
ability over time. A measure of unanticipated volatility that reflects both the unan-
ticipated component of growth and the (time-varying) conditional variance of growth
forecasts is given by εˆt /σˆ t. This variable can be conceived as a measure determin-
ing how different a given growth rate change is from the historical pattern.
VI. GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS
The causality models and results will be presented. In the case of causality from
export growth to GNP growth, the results given in Table IV are based on the follow-
ing model:
gt = α0 + ∑α jgt−j + ∑β j∆logExportst−j + ε t, (4)
where gt is the per capita GNP growth, α0 is a constant, α j and β j are parameters,
and εt is the disturbance term. Common lags of two (i.e., r = s = 2) were chosen
throughout this investigation and for all the models employed. In these tests causal-
ity is validated in the sense that predictive power is enhanced if the β j coefficients
r
j=1
s
j=1
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TABLE  IV
TAIL AREAS OF TESTS OF GRANGER CAUSALITY FROM EXPORT AND IMPORT GROWTH TO GNP GROWTH
Country From Exports to GNP From Imports to GNP
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon .545 .205
Congo .262 .122
Côte d’Ivoire .173 .228
Ghana .146 .664
Kenya .735 .999
Madagascar .318 .638
Malawi .680 .980
Mali .424 .383
Mauritius .321 .164
Nigeria .446 .343
Senegal .977 .463
South Africa .137 .237
Tanzania .419 .595
Zambia .446 .998
Zimbabwe .296 .864
South Asia
India .353 .623
Pakistan .533 .100
Sri Lanka .723 .998
East Asia and Pacific
China .506 .265
Indonesia .097 .144
Korea, Rep. .492 .443
Malaysia .881 .998
Philippines .927 .601
Thailand .160 .848
Latin America and Caribbean
Argentina .915 .497
Barbados .389 .570
Bolivia .864 .765
Brazil .848 .998
Chile .953 .901
Colombia .526 .440
Costa Rica .948 .931
Ecuador .263 .323
El Salvador .126 .246
Guatemala .575 .998
Honduras .643 .890
Jamaica .821 .940
Mexico .926 .646
Nicaragua .953 .883
Paraguay .999 .998
Peru .774 .516
Trinidad & Tobago .980 .779
Uruguay .938 .497
Venezuela .499 .987
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Middle East and North Africa
Algeria .974 .994
Egypt .641 .469
Morocco .648 .863
Oman .066 .121
Saudi Arabia .701 .741
Tunisia .422 .853
Turkey .952 .559
Note: Low p-values imply strong marginal predictive power.
TABLE  IV  (Continued)
Country From Exports to GNP From Imports to GNP
are significantly different from zero so that gt in addition to its dependence on
lagged gt is also dependent on lagged values of export growth rates. In none of the
fifty sampled countries did we obtain such a causality at the 5 per cent level (at the
10 per cent level Indonesia and Oman, both oil exporters were the only countries
with causality from export growth to GNP growth).
Causality tests from import growth to GNP growth were derived from a model
with parallel interpretations as above, i.e.,
gt = α0 + ∑αjgt−j + ∑β j∆logImportst−j + εt. (5)
Again no causality whatsoever was detectable at the 5 per cent level (at the 10
per cent level, import growth in Pakistan was found to cause per capita GNP growth).
To test if export growth volatility is related to GNP growth in the Granger sense,
the following regression equation was employed:
2gt = α0 + ∑αjgt−j + ∑β jσˆ t−j + ∑γj(εˆ t−j /σˆ t−j) + ε t, (6)
2where gt is the (per capita) GNP growth rate, σˆ t is the GARCH (1, 1) anticipated
volatility of export growth, and εˆ t /σˆ t the unanticipated volatility of export growth.
We selected common lags of two and reported the results in Table V.
In Table V, F1 is the test of the null hypothesis in which in a regression of gt on
lagged values of itself and anticipated export growth volatility, the coefficients of
anticipated export growth volatility are zero. F2 is the test of the null hypothesis in
which in a regression of gt on lagged valued of itself and unanticipated export growth
volatility, the coefficients of unanticipated export growth volatility are zero. F3 is
the test of the null hypothesis in which in a regression of gt on lagged values of
itself and anticipated and unanticipated export growth volatility, the coefficients of
both anticipated and unanticipated export growth volatility are zero.
r
j=1
s
j=1
r
j=1
s
j=1
k
j=1
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TABLE  V
TAIL AREAS OF TESTS OF GRANGER CAUSALITY FROM GARCH(1, 1) ANTICIPATED AND
UNANTICIPATED EXPORT GROWTH VOLATILITY TO PER CAPITA GNP GROWTH
Country F1 F2 F3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon .217 .740 .414
Congo .418 .355 .216
Côte d’Ivoire .449 .192 .177
Ghana .436 .160 .108
Kenya .258 .839 .406
Madagascar .402 .251 .357
Malawi .372 .912 .693
Mali .433 .277 .283
Mauritius .480 .687 .680
Nigeria .695 .585 .378
Senegal .533 .968 .916
South Africa .428 .089 .012
Tanzania .911 .330 .306
Zambia .672 .320 .461
Zimbabwe .148 .602 .073
South Asia
India .322 .333 .365
Pakistan .993 .356 .104
Sri Lanka .999 .774 .998
East Asia and Pacific
China .324 .271 .196
Indonesia .053 .326 .096
Korea, Rep. .592 .607 .661
Malaysia .168 .769 .453
Philippines .403 .947 .126
Thailand .800 .144 .199
Latin America and Carbbean
Argentina .993 .576 .060
Barbados .576 .402 .386
Bolivia .598 .741 .872
Brazil .463 .916 .993
Chile .999 .997 .985
Colombia .995 .503 .632
Costa Rica .459 .933 .523
Ecuador .339 .378 .326
El Salvador .521 .128 .056
Guatemala .250 .561 .334
Honduras .305 .619 .314
Jamaica .889 .845 .992
Mexico .676 .998 .987
Nicaragua .336 .977 .692
Paraguay .358 .999 .819
Peru .999 .691 .786
Trinidad & Tobago .973 .998 .900
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Uruguay .927 .930 .962
Venezuela .329 .485 .239
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria .362 .670 .388
Egypt .452 .626 .279
Morocco .938 .376 .788
Oman .156 .513 .047
Saudi Arabia .167 .748 .180
Tunisia .151 .624 .299
Turkey .975 .651 .341
Note: Low p-values imply strong marginal predictive power.
TABLE  V  (Continued)
Country F1 F2 F3
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The results indicate that with very few exceptions neither anticipated nor unan-
ticipated export growth volatility improved significantly the predictive path of per
capita GNP growth. Indonesia shows that its anticipated export growth volatility
caused GNP growth per capita at the 5 per cent level; it appears that the strength of
this relationship led to the combined anticipated and unanticipated export growth
volatility at the 10 per cent level as a predictive factor of the country’s per capita
GNP growth. When unanticipated export growth volatility was considered, only
South Africa’s per capita GNP growth prediction was improved by it at the 10 per
cent level.
The combination of anticipated and unanticipated export growth volatility was
causally significant at the 5 per cent level for South Africa and Oman, whereas at
the 10 per cent level this causality relation was significant for Zimbabwe, Indone-
sia, Argentina, and El Salvador.
To test the hypothesis that import growth volatility is related to GNP growth in
the Granger sense, we presented the results in Table VI, in the same way as those in
2Table V, based on equation (7) with σˆ t now being the GARCH(1, 1) anticipated
volatility of import growth and εˆ t /σˆ t the unanticipated volatility of import growth.
The F1, F2, and F3 tests represent the null hypothesis in which in a regression of per
capita GNP growth on lagged values of itself and correspondingly on (1) antici-
pated, (2) unanticipated, and (3) anticipated and unanticipated import growth vola-
tility the relevant coefficients are zero. The results indicate that with the exception
of F1 for Indonesia which was significant at the 5 per cent level, in none of the other
countries was either anticipated or unanticipated import growth volatility causally
related to per capita GNP growth at either the 5 per cent or the 10 per cent level.
When F3 was considered, no causality was detected at the 5 per cent level, but at the
10 per cent level causality was traced in South Africa, Tanzania, Pakistan, and Ven-
ezuela.
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TABLE  VI
TAIL AREAS OF TESTS OF GRANGER CAUSALITY FROM GARCH(1, 1) ANTICIPATED AND
UNANTICIPATED IMPORT GROWTH VOLATILITY TO PER CAPITA GNP GROWTH
Country F1 F2 F3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon .216 .233 .102
Congo .479 .108 .293
Côte d’Ivoire .337 .314 .510
Ghana .999 .817 .519
Kenya .412 .994 .434
Madagascar .703 .647 .842
Malawi .482 .946 .984
Mali .602 .361 .187
Mauritius .417 .301 .146
Nigeria .925 .519 .673
Senegal .974 .637 .932
South Africa .237 .367 .082
Tanzania .149 .619 .083
Zambia .999 .976 .974
Zimbabwe .317 .991 .430
South Asia
India .224 .870 .738
Pakistan .551 .496 .061
Sri Lanka .626 .999 .272
East Asia and Pacific
China .266 .394 .127
Indonesia .041 .444 .234
Korea, Rep. .842 .778 .711
Malaysia .999 .961 .916
Philippines .679 .666 .995
Thailand .773 .980 .785
Latin America and Caribbean
Argentina .481 .648 .250
Barbados .185 .812 .296
Bolivia .959 .545 .548
Brazil .588 .713 .593
Chile .993 .833 .973
Colombia .980 .674 .921
Costa Rica .999 .731 .843
Ecuador .598 .324 .195
El Salvador .492 .460 .505
Guatemala .999 .998 .998
Honduras .639 .959 .808
Jamaica .231 .839 .199
Mexico .323 .734 .551
Nicaragua .986 .838 .986
Paraguay .192 .965 .197
Peru .997 .498 .624
Trinidad & Tobago .442 .493 .112
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Uruguay .630 .802 .384
Venezuela .448 .958 .097
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria .427 .998 .545
Egypt .979 .367 .549
Morocco .777 .725 .961
Oman .209 .335 .137
Saudi Arabia .426 .517 .960
Tunisia .161 .967 .364
Turkey .267 .284 .105
Note: Low p-values imply strong marginal predictive power.
TABLE  VI  (Continued)
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CONCLUSIONS
Exports as vehicles, if not as engines of growth, are important to developing coun-
tries by improving their factor utilization, expanding factor endowments, generat-
ing a multiplicity of forward and backward linkages, earning valuable foreign ex-
change, and forcing them to keep up with technological changes and protecting
their international competitiveness.17 The extent to which these benefits are dis-
seminated depends on such factors as country size, the diversity of resource endow-
ments, state of technology applied, and the degree of openness. If there were uni-
form patterns of export benefits, despite the striking heterogeneity of developing
countries, they would be revealed by statistical tests and most certainly by causality
analysis.
Our investigation which covered all the fifty countries with continuous data from
1970 to 1993 shows that export growth has not been an engine of growth, not even
in the cases of the Asian tigers, which are used as the phenomenal paradigms of
export-led growth by neoclassical scholars. Our tests in general did not support the
hypothesis that export growth led to GNP growth in a Granger sense. Only in two
oil-exporting countries (Indonesia and Oman) was such a causality demonstrated,
17 Under ceteris paribus conditions the long-run implications of export growth lead to transfer of
valuable resources abroad that damages domestic future growth potential. This inference is remi-
niscent of Adam Smith’s devastating criticisms of the extreme version of mercantilism which el-
evated the import of gold as the primary goal of economic policy in general, and export growth in
particular (a more accurate interpretation of mercantilism considers growth through export growth
and import substitution as its policy objective). The ceteris paribus conditions involved in this
inference are not realistic for developing countries, which face chronic balance of payments prob-
lems and depend heavily on imports of capital, technology, and know-how. For them the growth of
exports is not an end in itself, but a means toward modernization and sustained growth.
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and only at the 10 per cent level. When volatility was introduced in our causality
analysis, anticipated export growth volatility was found to be associated with GNP
growth in only the case of Indonesia at the 5 per cent level; unanticipated export
growth volatility was found to be causally related to GNP growth in the single case
of South Africa at the 10 per cent level; whereas for anticipated and unanticipated
export growth volatility causality was marginally more evident in six cases (South
Africa, Oman, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Argentina, and El Salvador) mainly at the 10
per cent level. From the entire sample only Indonesia and Oman appeared to ex-
hibit reliable causality from export growth to GNP growth, and in both countries it
is likely that their dependence on oil exports produced the obtained outcome.
The search for causality from import growth to GNP growth was motivated by
the large foreign indebtedness which might enable developing countries to harmo-
nize their capital imports and thus reduce drastic internal dislocations. It appears
that foreign indebtedness has not contributed to industrial or export restructuring18
and may have provided only a temporary relief from the external oil shock which
was attenuated over time, as shown by the cointegration between exports and im-
ports. But since cointegration was not perfect, and for purposes of analytical com-
pleteness, causality tests from import growth to GNP growth were conducted. As
sparse was the evidence in the export growth causality tests, so equally sparse it
was here as well. Only Pakistan was found to exhibit causality from import growth
to GNP growth. When tests of import growth volatility were carried out, antici-
pated import growth volatility was found at the 5 per cent level to lead to GNP
growth in a Granger sense in Indonesia, whereas at the 10 per cent level anticipated
and nonanticipated import growth volatility was leading to growth again in Paki-
stan in a Granger sense, but also in South Africa, Tanzania, and Venezuela.
Based on the evidence collected from a highly comprehensive sample of devel-
oping countries, an overall conclusion emerges, namely, that irrespective of the
geographical location or level of development, export growth and much less import
growth do not causally affect per capita GNP growth. In stating our conclusion we
do not by any means suggest that the sampled countries would be equally well-off
without as with international trade. This study does not imply that international
trade plays a minor role in the process of development, but rather that the main
development forces are derived from domestic sources. The gains from trade are
well documented by the theory of comparative advantage. But this theory does not
qualify as a theory of growth. Beyond its gains that energize domestic resources,
development as a process of radical institutional and structural transformations de-
pends more on the domestic development dynamic than on trade with other coun-
tries. International trade can contribute to development but is not strategically in-
dispensable.
18 See Afxentiou and Serletis (1995).
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